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FORTY years ago Bohlen expressed the view that "There is no dis-
tinction more deeply rooted in the common law and more fundamental
than that between misfeasance and non-feasance, between active mis-
conduct working positive injury to others and passive inaction, a fail-
ure to take positive steps to benefit cthers, or to protect them from
harm not created by any wrongful act of the defendant." 1
The line between "active misconduct" and "passive inaction" is not
easily drawn. The range of human conduct theoretically susceptible
of tort consequence runs from the zenith of clearly affirmative mis-
conduct (misfeasance) to the nadir of clear inaction (nonfeasance),
but there exists an area of shadow-land where misfeasance and non-
feasance coalesce. The existence of this shadow-land is well illustrated
by Bohlen's famous example. 2 For one to use a chattel known to be
defective in such a way as to create a serious risk of harm to others is
palpably a misfeasance. On the other hand a failure to take steps to
provide protection for people who come on one's premises without in-
vitation and without permission is patently passive inaction, a non-
feasance. But between those extreme cases consider a median situation
where one uses a chattel for a particular purpose without having ascer-
tained by inspection or othenvise whether it is fit for that purpose,
with knowledge that the article, if defective, will create a serious risk
of harm to others. Here there exists an admixture of nonfeasance and
misfeasance. There is action-the utilization of the chattel-and there
is nonfeasance-the failure to perform an inspection to ascertain
whether or not the chattel was defective.
Many tort problems fall into the so-called pseudo-nonfeasance
category' For example, a plaintiff is run down by an automobile
driven by defendant by reason of the fact that defendant fails to sound
his horn and fails to apply his brakes. Superficial analysis may suggest
that this is a nonfeasance-that is, that the plaintiff is complaining
of the defendant's omission to sound the horn and apply the brakes.
In truth, however, the plaintiff is complaining of nothing of the sort.
The gravamen of his cause of action is the anti-social act of the defend-
ant in propelling the vehicle forward so as to run the plaintiff down,
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and the failure to use brakes and horn is merely the reason why the act
is anti-social in character. This is the typical automobile negligence
misfeasance. An item of omission is involved, it is true--omission to
use ordinary care. But this nonfeasance of a duty of care is simply the
reason why the act of physical contact is anti-social or delinquent.
There is no pure nonfeasance because the defendant has acted.
Another difference is noticeable between action and inaction, and it
is this difference which accounts in part for the divergent legal con-
sequences often applied to misfeasance and nonfeasance. In an in-
stance where the defendant has harmed the plaintiff by his action, he
has been guilty of positively making the plaintiff's status worse: by
affirmative measures he has created a new risk of harm. But where the
defendant's alleged delinquency lies only in his passivity, he has merely
failed to benefit the plaintiff by interfering in the latter's affairs. 4
PRESENT STATUS OF THE LAW OF AFFImATIVE TORT DUTIES
A convenient way to comprehend the concept of nonfeasance is to
classify the most familiar situations in which affirmative duties to act
are held to exist. The present categorization does not purport to be
exhaustive, but it does give a generalized picture of the range of affir-
mative duty in tort.
Duties Arising Out of the Occupancy of Land
Duties incident to the tenure of real property are imposed upon the
owners and occupiers of such property, and the failure to perform such
duties, technically a nonfeasance, results in liability towards certain
categories of persons on the land or in areas adjacent to the land. The
general proposition is that a land occupier is under a duty to make
reasonable use of his property so as to cause no unreasonable harm to
those in the vicinity of the property.5 The liability is predicated mainly
4. PROSSER, Tors 191 (1941). Bohlen uses the analogy of mathematics. "In the
one case the defendant, by interfering with plaintiff or his affairs, has brought a new
harm upon and created a minus quantity, a positive loss. In the other, by failing to in-
terfere in the plaintiff's affairs, the defendant has left him just as he vas before; no
better off, it is true, but still in no worse position; he has failed to benefit him, but he
has not caused him any new injury nor created any new injurious situation. There is here
a loss only in the sense of an absence of a plus quantity. It is this latter difference uhich
in fact lies at the root of the marked difference in liability at common law for the con-
sequences of misfeasance and non-feasance." Bohlen, supra note 1, at 220. Eldrcdge taLes
the same view. "There is a fundamental difference, I believe, ictween a misfeasance and
a nonfeasance.... The man who is guilt, of a misfeasance makes the other's condition
worse than it was before, while the man who is guilty of a nonfeasance does not worsen
the other's condition." ELrI)REGE, op. cit. supra note 3, at 13.
5. For an analysis of land duties in terms of reasonable and unreasonable user, see
Smith, Reasonable Use of One's Own Propcrty as a Justification for Damage to a Ncigh-
bor, 17 COL. L. Rnv. 383 (1917).
19491 1273
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
on possession of the realty rather than on ownership, the theory being
that the possessor is in control and can more easily perform duties of
protection.6
No effort is made here to delimit the full scope of a land occupier's
liability for nonfeasance; it is sufficient to point out the broad outlines
of responsibility. There exists, first of all, the traditional Anglo-Amer-
ican rule that the possessor of land does not have the affirmative obli-
gation to protect persons outside the premises against risks incident
to the natural condition of the land, such as the falling of a decayed
tree upon a public highway. This rule grew up in an agricultural
economy when land was largely in a natural state and when the burden
of inspection would have been a heavy one. There are indications,
however, that a rule imposing liability in respect to natural conditions
may be arising in the urban centers of our society.'
With reference to persons who have actually entered the premises,
liability for nonfeasance is dependent upon the legal tag which the
court attaches to the plaintiff. If he be a "mere trespasser," that is,
one on the land without permission and without business invitation,
there is no affirmative duty to make the premises safe.' This rule has
been qualified by the "attractive nuisance" doctrine, under which
many courts allow recovery for failure to put land in a safe condition
for children whose trespasses could be reasonably anticipated. 0
If the entrant be denominated a "licensee", i.e., on land with per-
mission but without business invitation," no duty of care is owed to
6. A lessor out of possession is in general under no obligation to keep the premiseS
in repair. Phelan v. Fitzpatrick, 188 Mass. 237, 74 N.E. 326 (1905) ; Newman v. Golden,
108 Conn. 676, 144 At]. 467 (1928); Wolf v. Kilpatrick, 101 N.Y. 146, 4 N.E, 188
(1886). See Harkrider, Tort Liability of a Landlord, 26 MIcH. L. REv. 260 (1928).
7. Chambers v. Whelan, 44 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1930) (no duty to inspect trees grow-
ing naturally on the premises to determine dangerous state of decay). But cf. Brandy-
wine Hundred Realty Co. v. Cotillo, 55 F.2d 231 (3d Cir. 1931).
8. Indicative of this tendency may be Brown v. Milwaukee Terminal Ry., 199 Wis,
575, 227 N.W. 385 (1929) (liability imposed for allowing tree to decay and collapse in
city street). See also Weller v. McCormick, 52 NJ.L. 470, 19 At. 1101 (Sup. Ct. 1890).
9. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 333 (1934) ; Lary v. Cleveland, C., C. & I. R.R., 78 Ind.
323 (1881); Augusta Ry. v. Andrews, 89 Ga. 653, 16 S.E. 203 (1892).
10. Railroad Co. v. Stout, 17 Wall. 657 (U.S. 1873) and Keffe v. Milwaukee & St.
P. Ry., 21 Minn. 207 (1875) were the early American cases; the doctrine has sometimes
been called the "turntable doctrine" by reason of the fact that those cases involved rail-
road turntables. See generally on the attractive nuisance doctrine Hudson, The Turntable
Cases in the Federal Courts, 36 HARV. L. REv. 826 (1923); Wilson, Limitations oft the
Attractive Nuisance Doctrine, 1 N. C. L. REv. 162 (1923); Aderman, The Attractive
Nuisance Doctrine with Emphasis Upon its Application in Wisconsin, 21 MARQ. L.
Rnv. 116 (1937) ; RESTATEMENT, TORT S § 339 (1934).
11. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 330 (1934). Occasionally the qualifying epithets "naked,"
"bare" or "mere" are used in refering to the licensee. The adjectival qualification seem
largely meaningless, except perhaps to indicate a predilection in the court towards denial
of liability.
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make the premises reasonably safe for his arrival unless the attractive
nuisance doctrine intervenes. 12 Yet, while the licensee is not entitled
to demand of the land occupier that he make the premises safe, the
modem rule appears to place upon the occupier an affirmative duty to
warn of concealed dangerous conditions, and to that extent liability
attaches for injury resulting from omission.' 3
Another category of persons on land is that of the "initee" or "busi-
ness visitor," customarily defined as one on land upon business which
concerns the occupier of the land and upon invitation, actual or con-
structive. 14 The occupier must exercise reasonable care to warn the
business visitor or to make the premises safe for him in respect to dan-
gerous activities or conditions of which the land occupier knows or
which he could discover by reasonable inspection.15 Apparently this
duty is exacted as a price for the economic benefit conferred or expected
to be conferred by the visitor.'6 It is a definite affirmative obligation,
and liability will attach for nonfeasance.
Possibilities of liability for nonfeasance also exist on the part of
vendors and lessors of land. Although a vendor's liability for nonfeasance
after he has parted with possession is extremely restricted, ' he may be
liable for failure to disclose to the vendee concealed dangers of which
he knew and of which the vendee neither knew nor could be expected
to discover by reasonable inspection."5 There is no obligation on the
12. Louisville & N. R.R.v. Page, 203 Ky. 755, 263 S.W. 20 (1924); Holmgren v. Red
Lake Falls Milling Co., 169 Minn. 268, 210 N.W. 1000 (1926).
13. RESTAT=iT, TORTS § 342 (1934). Lawson v. Shreveport Watcrmorks Co., 111
La. 73, 35 So. 390 (1903) ; Smith v. Southwest Missouri R.R., 333 Mo. 314, 62 S.WV2d
761 (1933) ; Recreation Centre Corp. v. Zimmerman, 172 MCd. 309, 191 At. 233 (1937).
A few courts still announce the rule that the only duty owed to a licensee is to rcfrain
from wilful or Wanton injury, but the increasing regard for human rights as oppoed to
property rights has caused this strict position rapidly to deteriorate. Representative of
the rigidity of the strict rule are O'Brien v. Union Freight R.R., 209 Mass. 449, 95 N.E.
861 (1911) and Sohn v. Katz, 112 N.J.L. 106, 169 Atl. 833 (1934).
14. Typical of invitees are customers in a store and patrons of restaurants, banks,
and amusement places. The invitee category includes a large and amorphous group dif-
ficult of synthesis even around the broad principles of business purpose.
15. Royer v. Najarian, 60 R-I. 368, 193 AtL 562 (1938) ; Schroeder v. Great Atlantic
& Pacific Tea Co., 220 Wis. 642, 265 N.W. 559 (1936). See Griffith, Duly of Inzhitrs,
32 L. Q. REv. 255 (1916), and cf. Griffith, Liccnsors and "Traps," 41 L. Q. Rmw. 255
(1925).
16. Bohlen, The Basis of Affirmathir Obligations in the Law of Tort, 44 A. L.
REo. (N.S.) 209, 227 (1905) (reprinted in BOHLEN, STUDIES IN ThE Liw or Tonrs 33
(1926)); SALmO.ND, THE LAw oF TORTS 476 (10th ed. 1945). There is an alternative
theory that the basis of liability to invitees is an implied representation on the part of
the land owner that he has made the premises safe for those persons entering for a pur-
pose valuable in some way to the land occupier. PRossrm, op. cit. supra note 4, at 638.
17. E. g., a vendor is not ordinarily responsible to persons outside the premises for
risks incident to disrepair. Palmore Nv. Morris, 182 Pa. 82, 37 Ad. 995 (1897).
18. Kilmer v. White, 254 N.Y. 64, 171 N.E. 908, 10 B. U. L. Rnv. 567 (1930).
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vendor to disclose defects which a reasonable inspection by the vendee
would disclose.
The affirmative duty of a lessor is more extensive than that of a
vendor, presumably because a lessor continues to derive economic
benefit from ownership of the premises and therefore should not be
permitted to escape liability entirely. While the lessor is not ordinarily
responsible for conditions which develop subsequent to the transfer
of possession, 9 he may be liable, like the vendor, for concealed dan-
gerous conditions existing at the time of the transfer of which he knew
and of which the lessee could not be expected to learn by reasonable
inspection. 2 Then again, if the land be leased for a public purpose, the
lessor is held to an affirmative duty to inspect and repair the premises
before transferring possession. 21 And, of course, if the lessor retains
control of part of the premises, such as common passageways, he has
the ordinary duty of an occupier as to such portions. 2 If the lessor
covenants with the lessee to keep the premises in repair, he is liable in
contract to the lessee for breach of the covenant 23 but is not, under the
prevailing rule, liable to the tenant 24 or to third parties for tort dam-
ages by reason of his nonfeasance..2 1
Duties Arising Out of the Manufacture and Supply of Chattels
The effect of economic and social developments on the course of the
common law is seen in the growth pattern of the rules applicable to
manufacturers and suppliers of chattels towards persons sustaining
personal injury or property damage because of some defect in the make-
up of the chattel .2  These developments have necessitated many qual-
19. Ward v. Fagin, 101 Mo. 669, 14 S.W. 738 (1890); Fisher v. Thirkell, 21 Mich.
1 (1870). See also cases cited in note 6 supra, and Harkrider, supra note 6, at 260.
20. Cowen v. Sunderland, 145 Mass. 363, 14 N.E. 117 (1887); Keegan v. G. Heile-
man Brewing Co., 129 Minn. 496, 152 N.W. 877 (1915). The same rule, of course, ap-
plies to a vendor of realty. See Kilmer v. White, supra note 18.
21. Junkermann v. Tilyou Realty Co., 213 N.Y. 404, 103 N.E. 190 (1915) (amuse-
ment park) ; Colorado Mortgage & Inv. Co. v. Giacomini, 55 Colo. 540, 136 Pac. 1039
(1913) (hotel) ; Folkman v. Lauer, 244 Pa. 605, 91 At. 218 (1914) (grandstand).
22. Sawyer v. McGillicuddy, 81 Me. 318, 17 At. 124 (1889) ; Inglehardt v. Mueller,
156 Wis. 609, 146 N.W. 808 (1914).
23. Schick v. Flesichhauer, 26 App.Div. 210, 49 N.Y.Supp. 962 (1st Dep't 1898);
Davis v. Smith, 26 R.I. 129, 58 Atl. 630 (1904).
24. Hanson v. Cruse, 155 Ind. 176, 57 N.E. 904 (1900) ; Williams v. Fenster, 103
NJ.L. 566, 137 Atl. 406 (1927).
25. Cullings v. Goetz, 256 N.Y. 287, 176 N.E. 397 (1931) ; Harris v. Lewiston Trust
Co., 326 Pa. 145, 191 Atl. 34 (1937); Noble v. Marx, 298 N.Y. 106, 81 N.E.2d 40
(1948). A growing minority rule would, however, create a tort duty growing out of the
contract and extending to the tenant, the tenant's family, and to others on the land in
the tenant's right. See Ashmun v. Nichols, 92 Ore. 223, 178 Pac. 234 (1919) ; Dean v.
Hershowitz, 119 Conn. 398, 177 Atl. 262 (1935).
26. See Clark, Let the Maker Beware, 19 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 85 (1945).
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ifications of the rule originally laid down in Winterbottom v. Wright -
that there is no duty to anyone other than the immediate vendee to
employ reasonable care to discover defects.
The first exception was in permitting liability for an act of negligence
in the preparation or sale of an imminently dangerous article which was
intended to preserve, destroy or affect human life. In such a case the
seller was held liable to third persons who suffered from his negligence.0
In MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co."3 Judge Cardozo further qualified
the TVinterbottoin v. Wright holding. The modem rule seems to be as
follows: A manufacturer owes the affirmative obligation to employ
reasonable care in the manufacture or assembling of chattels which,
while not necessarily dangerous if properly constructed, constitute a
menace to life and limb if not properly made ;'- and this duty is owed not
only to his immediate vendee, but to anyone likely to be harmed by
the defective article while such a chattel is being lawfully used for the
purpose intended. 31 The ,IMacPherson rule also applies to property
damage, 3 2 and has been extended to cover even the manufacturer of a
defective part of a chattel. 3
Therefore, regardless of "privity of contract," the manufacturer is
liable to the remote vendee when the article is knownm to be inherently
dangerous;3 4 when the article sold, while not dangerous if properly
constructed, would be a menace if not carefully made ; and when there
is negligence in manufacturing the article even if there is a duty on the
part of some other person to inspect." There may also be liability
without fault-applied in food cases-on the theory of implied warranty
of fitness for use. 7
27. 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842). Plaintiff, driver of a coach, sought
to recover from a contractor who had agreed with a third party to keep the coach in
repair for injuries sustained when the coach broke down. No recovery vms allowed bL-
cause of plaintiff's failure to show "privity of contract."
28. Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852). See Norton v. Sev.all, 16 Mass. 143
(1870) (sale of laudanum for rhubarb); Peters v. Johnson, 50 W.Va. 644, 41 S.E. 190
(1902) (sale of saltpeter for epsom salts).
29. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid. Berg v. Otis Elev. Co., 64 Utah 518, 231 Pac. 832 (1924); Rosebrocl: v.
General Elec. Co., 236 N. Y. 227, 140 N.E. 571 (1923).
32. G.C.P. Fire Relief Ass'n v. Sonnenborn, 263 N.Y. 463, 189 N.E. 551 (1934).
33. Smith v. Peerless Glass Co., 259 N.Y. 292, 181 N.E. 576 (1932).
34. Cases cited note 28 supra.
35. Noone v. Perlberg, Inc., 294 N.Y. 60, 60 N.E2d S39 (1945); Huet v. J. I.
Case Threshing Machine Co., 120 Fed. 865 (8th Cir. 1903).
36. Rosebrock v. General Elec. Co., 236 N.Y. 227, 140 N.E. 571 (1923).
37. Boyd v. Coca Cola Bottling Works, 132 Tenn. 23, 177 S.W. 20 (1915); Cul-
bertson v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 157 S.C. 352, 154 S.E. 424 (1930). Contra: Chysiry
v. Drake, 235 N.Y. 468, 139 N.E. 576 (1923).
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Duties Arising Out of the Master-Servant Relation
A host of affirmative duties spring from the master-servant relation.
The master is under a duty to provide a safe place of work," satisfac-
tory tools,"9 and competent fellow servants." The master must also
give warning of dangers which are not readily apparent, 4' and must
make reasonable rules for regulating the activities of the shop.42 As a
practical matter the common-law action for breach of these duties has
virtually disappeared with the adoption of the Workmen's Compensa-
tion statutes, but the obligations still exist as a basic minimum of
employer duty.
4 3
Where the nature of the employment is such that the servant is
quite dependent on his master for protection, and where the probability
of help from other sources is minimal, it is not uncommon to hold the
master for a failure to provide proper or prompt aid to an injured serv-
ant.44 The principle is well exemplified by Harris v. Pennsylvania R. R.46
which, though tinged with elements of maritime law, indicates the
basic philosophy of the duty. There a seaman, without any negligence
on the part of the officers or crew of the defendant's vessel, fell over-
board through his own negligence, and the owners of the ship were held
liable for a failure of the officers and crew to make a reasonable effort
to save him.
Similarly, a railroad is under the duty of giving aid to an injured
employee, at least where the situation is emergency in character so as
38. Burns v. Delaware & A. Telegraph & Telephone Co., 70 N.J.L. 745, 59 Atl, 220
(1904) ; Simone v. Kirk, 173 N.Y. 7, 65 N.E. 739 (1902).
39. Chicago Union Traction Co. v. Sawusch, 218 Ill. 130, 75 N.E. 797 (1905) ; Welle
v. Celluloid Co., 175 N.Y. 401, 67 N.E. 609 (1903).
40. Louisville & N. R.R. v. Davis, 91 Ala. 487, 8 So. 552 (1890); Coppins v. New
York Cent. & H. R.R., 122 N.Y. 557, 25 N.E. 915 (1890).
41. Brennan v. Gordon, 118 N.Y. 489, 23 N.E. 810 (1890) ; Daly v. Kid, 106 La. 170,
30 So. 254 (1901). No warning of obvious dangers is necessary. Chicago & A. Ry. v.
Bell, 209 Ill. 25, 70 N.E. 754 (1904).
42. Doing v. New York, 0. & W. Ry., 151 N.Y. 579, 45 N.E. 1028 (1897) ; Merrill
v. Oregon Short Line R.R., 29 Utah 264, 81 Pac. 85 (1905).
43. On the theory and effect of the Workmen's Compensation statutes, see Bohlen,
A Problem in the Drafting of Workmeins Compensatio Acts, 25 HAnW. L. Ray. 328
(1912); Wambaugh, Workmen's Compensation Acts; Their Theory and Their Constitu-
tionality, 25 HIv. L. REv. 129 (1911); Mechem, Employer's Liibilily, 44 Am. L. Rnv.
221 (1910).
44. Hunicke v. Meramec Quarry Co., 262 Mo. 560, 172 S.W. 43 (1914) ; Troutman's
Adm'x v. Louisville & N. R.R., 179 Ky. 145, 200 S.W. 488 (1918); Bessemer Land &
Imp. Co. v. Campbell, 121 Ala. 50, 25 So. 793 (1899). The duty does not exist to an
employee outside the scope of the employment. Matthews v. Carolina & N. W. Ry., 175
N.C. 35, 94 S.E. 714 (1917).
45. 50 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1931), 30 MicH. L. REv. 479 (1931), 17 Coat. L. Q. 505
(1932) ; see The Iroquois, 194 U.S. 240 (1904) ; Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc.,
287 U.S. 367 (1932) ; Scarff v. Metcalf, 107 N.Y. 211, 13 N.E. 796 (1887).
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to preclude the probability of aid from other quarters.", And it must
provide protection against the weather for an employee working a
great distance from any place of food and shelter.A7 The rule seems to be
predicated upon the notion that railroad employment is frequently
hazardous and migratory so as to place the employee in unusual and
dangerous places.
Duties of Carriers to Passengers and Trespassers
It seems clear that a carrier is liable for failure to take reasonable
steps to aid a passenger imperiled through no fault of its own. In Yaroo
& 21. V. R.R. v. Byrd -' a passenger fell off a train through his own neg-
ligence, and the railroad employees left him lying near the track for
more than three hours when they could easily have taken him to a
physician at the next station. The railroad was held liable for failure
to perform the duty of proper attention after an accident.1 The im-
position of such a duty seems in line with the policy of the law of im-
posing upon carriers a heavy burden of care towards their passengers.: 3
46. Troutman's Adm'x v. Louisville & N. R.R., 179 Ky. 145, 2(60 S.W. 43 (1913);
Ohio & M1. Ry. v. Early, 141 Ind. 73, 40 N.E. 257 (1S95); Schumaker v. St. Paul &
D. kR.-, 46 Minn. 39,48 NA. 559 (1891).
47. Schurnaker v. St. Paul & D. R.K., 46 Minn. 39, 48 N.W. 559 (1S91). But cf.
Matthews v. Carolina & N. W. Ry., 175 N.C. 35, 94 S.E. 714 (1917). Plaintiff, an employee
of defendant company, lived with the company's permission in one of its cars. When the
car was threatened by flood waters plaintiff requested defendant to remove it to a safe
area. Defendant declined the request, and plaintiff's goods were destroyed. The court
held the defendant was under no duty to rescue the servant's goods from the consequences
of a calamity for which defendant was not responsible.
48. 89 Mliss. 303, 42 So. 286 (1906).
49. For a general discussion of this problem see Warner, Duty of a Railway Com-
pany to Care for a Person It Has Without Fault Rcndcrcd Helpless, 7 C.%.w. L. Rw,.
312 (1919).
50. The carrier's duty of care is variously described by verbal formulae such as
"great care," "highest care," "extreme caution." Perhaps the most prevalent formula,
for what it may be worth, is "the utmost caution characteristic of very careful, prudent
men." Pennsylvania Co. v. Roy, 102 U.S. 451, 456 (1330). In Middleton v. Ahitridge,
213 N.Y. 499, 510, 103 N.E. 192, 197 (1915) the court defined the carrier's duty as fol-
lows: "If a passenger becomes sick and unable to care for himself during his journey, it
seems plain that the carrier owes him an added duty resulting from the change of situa-
tion. That duty springs from the contract to carry safely. Of course, the carrier is not
bound, unless it has notice of the fact, to observe that its passenger is ill, but if the
defendant's ser-vants kmew, or had notice of facts requiring them, in the exercise of
reasonable prudence, to know that the deceased was sick and in need of attention, it vwas
their duty to give him such reasonable attention as the circumstances and their obliga-
tions to other passengers permitted ... ." See also Hughes v. Gregory Bus Lines, Inc.,
157 Miss. 374, 128 So. 96 (1930) ; Central of Georgia Ry. v. Madden, 135 Ga. 205, 69
S.E. 165 (1910) ; Searcy v. Interurban Transp. Co., 1S9 La. 183, 179 So. 75 (1933).
A similar high affirmative duty might be expected of innkeepers to aid imp-.riled
guests, according to the intimations of Scholl v. Belcher, 63 Ore. 310, 127 Pac. 963
(1912). But cf. Plutner v. Silver Associates, Inc., 186 Misc. 1025 (N.Y.C.Mun.Ct. 1946),
19491 112,79
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
On the question whether a railroad is liable for omitting to care for
a trespasser who has been injured without fault on the part of the rail-
road the leading case is Union Pacific Ry. v. Cappier.51 There a tres-
passer was struck by a train without negligence by the railroad, and
the railroad employees failed to care for him so that he died a few hours
later. The court held there was no liability for this neglect," and the
ruling, while impossible to sustain in point of morality, appears to be
the law despite an isolated case to the contrary.5 3
DutiesA rising Out of the Gratuitous Undertaking
Where there is an undertaking to perform a gratuitous service, it
is generally held that one is not liable for an absolute failure to act but
may be liable if he has commenced performance. 4 Thus a railroad may
be held liable to an injured traveller where it gratuitously undertakes
to continue certain warning safeguards and fails to do so." Similarly,
liability was imposed where the owner of certain real estate was inter-
ested in purchasing adjoining property which was to be sold at auction,
and another person gratuitously offered to represent him in bidding at
where plaintiff, while availing himself of the facilities provided in defendant's bathhouse
at a seaside resort, fell and sustained injuries. The court held that defendant was under
no legal duty to offer relief or assistance when a patron became sick or was injured on
the theory that such a duty was not within the contemplation of the cost of admission to
an enterprise held out to the general public.
51. 66 Kan. 649, 72 Pac. 281 (1903).
52. The court found itself "unable to approve the doctrine that when the acts of
the trespasser himself results in his injury, where his own negligent conduct is alone
the cause, those in charge of the instrument which inflicted the hurt, being innocent of
wrongdoing, are nevertheless blameable in law if they neglect to administer to the suf-
ferings of him whose wounds we might say were self imposed . . . . For withholding
relief from the suffering, for failure to respond to the calls of worthy charity, or for
faltering in the bestowment of brotherly love on the unfortunate, penalties are found
not in the laws of men, but in that higher law, the violation of which is condemned by
the voice of conscience, whose sentence of punishment for the recreant act is swift and
sure." Union Pac. Ry. v. Cappier, 66 Kan. 649, 653, 72 Pac. 281, 282 (1903). In com-
menting on this case Harper observes that "Such pious incantations are not very con-
vincing for the notorious reason that the 'higher law' and 'the voice of conscience'
frequently fail to move men to take the minimum action that a civilized society requireg.
It is to be hoped that some courageous court will hold that the situation just described
creates a . . . legal duty to give such reasonable aid as the circumstances of the parties
require and permit." HARER, TORTS 199 (1933). To the same effect as the Cappier case
see Griswold v. Boston & Me. R.R., 183 Mass. 434, 67 N.E. 354 (1903).
53. Whitesides v. Southern Ry., 128 N.C. 229, 38 S.E. 878 (1901). A trespasser was
struck by a train and thrown off a trestle in a helpless condition. The court indicated
that, while there was no evidence to show that the railroad was negligent in striking the
trespasser initially, it would be negligence for the railroad employees not to stop and care
for the trespasser if they had knowledge that the accident had occurred.
54. Thorne v. Deas, 4 Johns. 84 (N.Y. 1809).
55. Bluhm v. Byram, 193 Wis. 346, 214 N.W. 364 (1927) ; Ray v. Hines, 118 Wash.
530, 203 Pac. 929 (1922).
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the sale. The failure of this latter individual to submit a bid on the
owner's behalf, after he had commenced the undertaking by going to
the auction, was held to result in liability.-" This willingness to find a
commencing of the undertaking-and hence a misfeasance-appears
regularly in these cases. 7
The problem is perhaps best illustrated in the insurance application
cases. A policy of insurance is of course a contract, ith the additional
requirement of insurable interest." The legal relations between an
applicant for insurance and the insurer, it is often said, are to be tested
and governed by the principles applicable to contracts in general.
But there is conflict as to whether the analogy applies to the question
of whether legal obligations arise only after a contract of insurance has
been made, or whether in certain circumstances a legal duty e.xsts to
act promptly upon an application for insurance and to inform the
applicant within a reasonable time whether his offer is accepted or
rejected. On the theory that the legal relations between the applicant
and the insurance company are purely contractual,", one view holds
that delay, mere inaction by an insurance company in passing on an
application, is not axf acceptance, and that such delay does not con-
stitute any breach of duty.6 ' The other view is that an insurance com-
pany upon receiving an application is under a legal duty to process the
56. Kirby v. Brown, WNheelock, Harris, Vought & Co., 229 App.Div. 155, 241
N.Y.Supp. 255 (1st Dep't 1930), rc'd on otlcr grounds, 255 N.Y. 274, 174 N.E. 652
(1931).
57. An analogous problem exists in the question of tort liability for nonperformance
of a contract. In Lichow v. Sowers, 334 Pa. 353, 6 A.2d 285 (1939) an attorney was
instructed to file certain petitions on behalf of a client. He failed to do so and neg-
lected to appear in court with the result that the client was adjudged in contempt. The
attorney was held liable on the theory that since he had undertaken to do certain
specific acts his failure to do so was a sufficient grounding for an action of tort. The
court did seem to feel, however, that an action in assumpsit vould have been more
appropriate. Cf. Livingston v. Cox, 6 Pa. 360 (1847).
58. For a discussion of the requirement of insurable interest, see Harnett &
Thornton, Insurable Intcrest in Property, A Socio-Economic Recval:,atlon of a Legal
Concept, 48 Coi. L. REV. 1162 (1943).
59. Zayc v. John Hancock Ins. Co., 338 Pa. 426, 13 A.2d 34 (1940). See Kessler,
Contracts of Adheson--Some Thogglts About Freedom of Contract, 43 CoL L. RE%.
629 (1943).
60. "It is undisputed that there is a clear moral obligation upon the company to
act without unreasonable delay; and it may very w,'ell be that there is a vague undefined
understanding that it intends and is expected to do so. But a contract implied in fact
must rest upon the intent of the parties; it requires an agreement, a meeting of the
minds, an intent to promise and be bound." Prosser, Delay in Acting on an Application
for Insurance, 3 U. OF Cn. L. Rrv. 39, 49 (1935).
61. 'Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Brady, 95 Ind. App. E64, 573, 174 N.E. 99, 102
(1930). The court in the Brady case used this language: "This legal duty must arise
by virtue of some express provision of the statute or from the contractual relation
existing between the parties whereby a legal duty, not a moral duty, devolves upon
the insurance company to act within a reasonable time upon an application submitted."
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application within a reasonable time," and is liable for negligent delay
in acting upon the application.63
One reason given for imposing a tort duty upon the insurance com-
pany is the recognition that the business of insurance is quasi-public
in character and that the nature of the risk is such that any appreciable
delay in acting on the application is likely to result in the very loss
against which the insurance is intended to indemnify. "4 Another pos-
sible reason for imposing the tort duty rather than taking the contract
approach is rooted in the distinction between nonfeasance and mis-
feasance. It is the familiar rule that where there is nothing more than
a voluntary promise, there is no obligation to carry it out, but once the
defendant starts to act upon the promise he may be held liable in
negligence where he fails to act as a reasonable man would under the
circumstances. 65 Insurance agents accepting applications with the
first premium attached may be said to have acted under this rule, so
that their principals are liable in tort for unreasonable delay in acting on
applications, even though liability in contract is foreclosed because of
the lack of a binding promise.
ANALYSIS OF THE PRESENT LAW OF AFFRiATIVE TORT DuTIE.s:
THE BENEFIT PRINCIPLE
Is there any single consistent principle which can be found running
through the apparently amorphous mass of affirmative duties in the
law of torts? Is there anything in common which can serve to analogize
the duties of land owners and occupiers, manufacturers and suppliers
of chattels, employers, carriers, and those who have failed to perform
gratuitous undertakings? The binding thread seems to be a benefit
principle.6 7 Affirmative duties are imposed only in situations where
the one under a duty to act has voluntarily brought himself into a
62. The duty in tort seems to arise only in those cases where the application is
accompanied by the first premium and is in every respect complete. Thetford v.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 27 Tenn. App. 600, 183 S.W.2d 314 (1943). It has been sug-
gested that whether or not a premium has been paid should have no bearing on the
question of the tort duty of prompt action so long as the applicant has performed all
other requirements of the application. See Note, 40 YALn. L. J. 121, 126 (1930).
63. Boyer v. State Farmers' Mutual Hail Ins. Co., 86 Kan. 442, 121 Pac. 329
(1912); Duffy v. Banker's Life Ass'n, 160 Iowa 19, 139 N.W. 1087 (1913); Dyer v.
Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 132 Wash. 378, 232 Pac. 346 (1925); DeFord v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 75 Colo. 146, 244 Pac. 1049 (1924). See also the discussion in
Funk, The Duty of an Insurer to Act Promptly on Applications, 75 U. or PA. L. Rnv.
207 (1927).
64. Bekken v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of the United States, 70 N.D. 122, 138-9,
293 N.W. 200, 210-11 (1940).
65. Siegel v. Spear & Co., 234 N.Y. 479, 138 N.E. 414 (1923).
66. Prosser, supra note 60, at 55.
67. The theory of benefit as the basis of positive duty is expounded by Bohlen,
sutpra note 16.
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certain relationship with others from which he obtains or expects
benefit. There is in a sense a "consideration" moving to the person
under the affirmative duty, although that "consideration" need not
move from the one asserting the right correlative to the duty.c The un-
expressed assumption seems to be that the compensatory nature of the
relationship between the person sought to be held liable and the person
injured is such an element of advantage as to justify the imposition of
duties more exacting than those which society normally requires of its
members.
Origins of the Benefit Principle
The earliest concept of tort was the direct invasion of another's
rights by affirmative misconduct. The primitive courts were concerned
primarily with violations of the King's peace, and the action of trespass
was criminal in its origin, with a fine being levied upon conviction.?9
Trespass was the remedy for forcible and direct injuries to persons and
property, no effort being made to exact retribution for failures to act.
In a primitive society the prime aim was the prevention of forcible
actions resulting in breaches of law and order; non-action was too
remote and ethereal to warrant the imposition of liability.
Liability for failure to act was a later development. It arose in the
circumstance where a consideration had been given and a duty as-
sumed. Where there was an alleged affirmative duty to protect others,
it was necessary that there be an assumpsit founded on a considera-
tion." In the case of certain public trades, such as innkeepers, carriers,
barbers, and physicians, the notion grew up that the persons plying
these trades were under a duty to accept any member of the public as
a customer, and hence as to them no assumpsit had to be alleged. Yet,
6S. Harper states the rationale of affirmative duties in these terms: "On the other
hand, an affirmative duty-may be imposed upon persons who are in no sense creating
risks by their activities. The duty here goes further and comprehends protection
against additional risks which are not brought into existence by the defendant. This
duty is not general, but is confined only to persons occupying certain relations to
others which are of such a character that the decencies of society require the affirmative
duty for its orderly regulation. The law fastens upon certain social relationships
certain corresponding responsibilities, and when the relationship is important enough
to require its safeguarding by legal rights and liabilities, legal duties are attached
thereto. Perhaps one of the most significant factors which has affected the develop-
ment of the law here is the element of advantage in the relationship for the person upon
whom affirmative obligations are imposed. No such day is im posed except in cases wlhcrcin
the relationship i s presu mab , of an advantagcos or beneficial nattre." Hwn--z, Toars
197 (1933) (Emphasis added).
69. For a history of the action of trespass see Woodbine, The Origins of the Action
of Trespass, 33 YAi L. J. 799 (1924), 34 YX'm L. J. 343 (1925).
70. Y. B. 3 Hen. VI, f. 36, pl 33: "If I bring deceit against one for this that he
was my attorney and by his negligence and default I lost my land, in this case it is
necessary that I declare how he was retained by me and took his fee."
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while the necessity for a formal assumpsit supported by a consideration
disappeared, the duty still rested on the firm base of an economic
benefit flowing to the tradesman by reason of his regular business
activities.
Apparently then the germ of the duty to take precautions to safe-
guard the safety of others was but an incident of the carrying on of a
business for gain. Thus it is that Bohlen, speaking of the origin of
affirmative obligations, expresses the view that "while everyone is
bound to refrain from action probably injurious to others, no duty to
take affirmative precautions for the protection of those voluntarily
placing themselves in contact with him is cast upon anyone save as the
price of some benefit to him. The duty is in fact founded on a considera-
tion moving to the obligor, though not necessarily from the obligee." 1
The same idea ran through the early English cases concerning real
property obligations.7 2 Any duty imposed for nonfeasance was a duty
growing out of a beneficial use of the property for a certain purpose and
not out of ownership alone.73
The Benefit Principle in the Modern Law of Affirmative Duties
By study of the situations in which an affirmative duty is imposed
it is possible to see the steady operation of the benefit principle through-
out the labyrinth of modern tort relationships. Taking the duties of
owners and occupiers of land as a specimen, it is found that a justifica-
tion for the heavy burden of duties surrounding possessors of land is
found in the potential or actual benefit derived from the use or rental
of such land. The land possessor has voluntarily performed the act of
acquiring the land 74 and occupies the land, presumably with the purpose
of reaping some form of benefit for himself, be it economic, social
or psychological. A "consideration" therefore flows to the land pos-
sessor, and as a "price" for that consideration certain affirmative
duties are imposed. The greater the benefit likely to accrue, the more
extensive is the duty. As has been indicated, duties to business visitors
are considerable in their affirmative aspect, while those to licensees are
less in scope, and those to trespassers nonexistent until the frontier
of actual misfeasance is crossed. The lines of duty and benefit follow
71. Bohlen, supra note 16, at 220.
72. Today liability of a possessor of land for nonfeasance may exist based on mere
ownership without beneficial use, the old rule having been altered to that extent, but
the idea of benefit is still paramount as indicated by the higher duty demanded towards
business visitors who presumably confer greater benefits on the possessor of the land.
73. See Giles v. Walker, 24 Q. B. D. 656 (1890).
74. Bohlen seems doubtful of the voluntary character of the act of acquiring land
in the case of inheritance. "The occupancy of real estate is, save perhaps when it
comes into one's possession by inheritance, a conscious voluntary act." Bohlen, supra
note 1, at 243. But even in the case of inheritance there must be an express or implied
acceptance of the property, and to that extent the occupancy is voluntary.
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each other in rough correlation on the graph of social obligations in
respect to real property, and as benefit increases so does duty.
The same substratum of benefit which operates in the land occupier
cases may be unearthed in the area of the obligation of vendors and
lessors of realty. The liability of the vendor is substantially less than
that of the lessor. The vendor has parted with possession, and his
economic or other benefit derived from the land has ceased to exist as
a continuing factor. The lessor on the other hand, though he has parted
with possession, retains still a residuum of economic benefit, and, so
long as that benefit continues, potentialities of liability remain in
Damoclean fashion suspended over him. This is not to say that the
sole operative principle here is that of benefit; patently it is not. Other
factors are of broad import, for example, ability to control the premises
and to effectuate repairs. The vendor's control is ended whereas the
lessor's may sometimes remain, and this is one of the important ele-
ments in imposing upon the lessor a greater duty. That control is an
important consideration is evidenced by the reluctance of the courts
to enforce liability even against a lessor where he has parted with con-
trol. However, the presence of the control element, while a complicat-
ing factor in the analysis, does not seem to detract from the strength
of the argument relative to the operation of the benefit principle in the
land cases.
The benefit principle also appears as an explanation for the common
carrier cases. The carrier obtains economic benefit from the carriage
of its passengers and also from the labor of its employees. Hence the
duty to protect them even in situations where they have become im-
periled through no fault of the carrier, may be regarded as the "price"
for the benefit conferred. The carrier has voluntarily entered into a
relationship with such persons, and it cannot complain when dis-
advantageous results attach to that relationship rather than the ex-
pected advantageous ones. Postulating the existence of the benefit
principle serves also to explain why the carrier is not held to a similar
affirmative duty towards trespassers whom it has without legal fault
injured. The carrier has not voluntarily entered into jural relations
with the trespasser. It derives no benefit either actual or potential
from the forced association with him, and is therefore held to no duty
to aid the trespasser when perils befall him. To analogize to the law
of contracts, there is here no consideration and hence no duty. This is
not to assert that there should be no duty; the umisdom of such judi-
cial callousness towards basic humanitarian principles is manifest.
The only point here made is that analytic distinction between the
trespasser and the passenger or employee cases is possible on the level
of the benefit principle.
The affirmative duties of manufacturers and suppliers of chattels
also fit well within the framework of the benefit principle. These
19491 1285
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persons have voluntarily placed themselves in relationships with their
immediate vendees and in less direct fashion with those members of the
consuming public who purchase and use the chattels. The whole aim
of the manufacturer or supplier is to obtain economic benefit through
the operation of the chain reaction represented by the manufacturer,
wholesaler, retailer, and consumer. Since benefit accrues to the manu-
facturer or supplier through this chain, it is not an illogical corollary
to require affirmative action, such as inspection, in order to safeguard
the members of the chain. Admittedly the corollary of duty and ben-
efit is not a necessary one; it does not follow that the most tenuous
benefit justifies the most onerous duty. The extent of the duty is a
matter of extrinsic policies. The attempt at this point is merely to
show the presence of the benefit as a common influential factor in all
the affirmative duty situations.
In the case of the master-servant relationship the master's affirmative
duties can be related to the benefit received by virtue of the relation-
ship. The economic well-being of the master is presumably enhanced
by the employing of a servant, and certain duties towards the servant
arise out of this employment. Again the benefit principle cannot be
regarded as explaining the entire ambit of the master's duties because
other factors also enter. There is the element of the master's control
over the conditions of work and the place of work which seems an im-
portant consideration in casting upon him the duty to provide both a
safe place of work and safe conditions. Then too the cases which have
placed the heaviest burden on the master have involved fact situations
wherein the peculiar nature of the employment made the servant un-
usually dependent upon the master as his sole means of aid."& As in the
case of the sailor at sea, where the maritime law has always imposed
high duties on the master, there are employments on land involving
comparative isolation of the servant from others and consequent in-
ability of the servant to provide for himself, and in such employments
higher affirmative duties are likely to be demanded of the master. This
indicates that, while the benefit principle operates in the master-
servant relationship, it is not the total criterion of the extent of the
master's duty. As in most affirmative duty situations, benefit is a sine
qua non for the existence of duty, but other policy considerations dic-
tate the orbit of duty.
In the developing area of tort liability for failure to perform gratui-
tous undertakings it is difficult to generalize with accuracy because
of the particularly fluid nature of the subject matter. It may, however,
be noted that here too is the same pattern of a relationship voluntarily
assumed. The factor which is customarily absent from the pattern is
75. As in Schumaker v. St. Paul & D. R.R., 46 Minn. 39, 48 N.W. 559 (1891) (rail-
road required to provide shelter against extremely inclement weather for worker
employed miles away from food and shelter).
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the benefit to the actor sought to be held liable. In many of these cases
there is no benefit to the gratuitous actor, but only detriment to the
person injured by the actor's failure to perform. The lack of the ben-
efit factor in these situations, in addition to the "contract" rationale,
may well account for the reluctance of the courts to move forward in
imposing liability in this field unless the case can be turned into a mis-
feasance situation.
Liability, then, seems to be imposed as a "price" for the benefit
conferred; where there is no benefit, actual or potential, there is no
duty to act. Herein lies the basic distinction between moral and legal
duty.
AFFIRMATIVE TORT DUTIES AND AMor DUTIES
In analyzing the present law of affirmative obligations it has been
seen that the basic consistent principle, insofar as consistency can be
found, is the principle of benefit. Application of this principle, how-
ever, results in serious discrepancies between duties at law and the
duties which moral consciousness would seem to dictate. "No action
will lie against a spiteful man, who seeing another running into a posi-
tion of danger, merely omits to warn him."-- G Nor will a physician be
liable for a failure to attend a man who is in dire danger of death.n
Similarly, one may stand idly by and watch another drown ", or bleed
to death.79 A railroad may ignore a trespasser injured by operation of
the train but without negligence of the railroad, - and a master need
not rescue his servant's goods from the ravages of a flood though the
master might easily do so."' A particularly shocking decision refused
to allow recovery for injuries to a child resulting from failure of those
in charge of certain dangerous machiner, to remove him from harm's
ay.82
76. Gautret v. Egerton, L. R. 2 C. P. 371, 375 (1867). See also Buch v. Amiory
Mlfg. Co., 69 N.H. 257, 260, 44 At. S09, 810 (1893): "With purely moral obligatikns,
the law does not deal. For example, the priest and Levite who passed by on the other
side were not, it is supposed, liable at law for the continued suffering of the man vlh
fell among thieves, which they might and morally ought to have prevented or re-
lieved. Suppose A, standing close by a railroad, sees a two-year-old babe on the tracy:
and a car approaching. He can easily rescue the child vith entire safety to himsdf,
and the instincts of humanity require him to do so. If he does not, he may, perhaps,
justly be styled a ruthless savage and a moral monster; but he is not liable in damage.
for the child's injury, or indictable under the statute for its death."
77. Hurley v. Eddingfield, 156 Ind. 416, 59 N.E. 1058 (1901).
78. Osterlind v. Hill, 263 Mass. 73, 160 N.E. 301 (1923).
79. Riley v. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry., 160 S.W. 595 (Tem. Civ. App. 1913); Allen v.
Hixson, 111 Ga. 460, 36 S.E. 810 (1900).
80. Union Pac. Ry. v. Cappier, 66 Kan. 649, 72 Pac. 281 (1903); Griswold v.
Boston & 'Me. R., 183 Mass. 434, 67 N.E. 354 (1903); cf. Whitesides v. Southern
Ry., 128 N.C. 229, 38 S.E. 878 (1901).
81. Matthews v. Carolina & N.W. Ry., 175 N.C. 35, 94 S.E. 714 (1917).
82. Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 69 N.H. 257, 44 Atl. 809 (1S93).
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While the absence of benefit to the person sought to be held liable
is the primary distinction between these so-called "moral obligation"
cases and the traditionally recognized situations in which liability for
nonfeasance is imposed, there are additional reasons for judicial re-
luctance to ignore that distinction. The "rugged individualism" of the
common law, historically viewed, tends to regard men as independent
and self-reliant. The laissez-faire approach of the common law re-
strained men from committing acts of affirmative harm but did not
make the government an agency for forcing men to help each other.
Another unexpressed judicial premise has been the feeling that it is a
more serious restraint on personal freedom to require a person to act
than it is to place limits on his liberty to act. 3
Also militating against the recognition of moral duties is the oft-
encountered difficulty of determining upon whom the responsibility
for action should rest and under what circumstances they should be
imposed. Everyone must refrain from committing affirmative wrongs.
But the problem is more intricate in the case of negative wrongs.
Suppose A is in danger and fifty men are at hand to rescue him. Must
all attempt the rescue under pain of liability? To what extent must a
man go in attempting to rescue or to give aid? Presumably he need not
risk his own life, but still the problem exists of drawing the line at some
point short of actual risk of life. 4 These are the kinds of problems
which have created judicial doubts as to the propriety of seeking to
equate law and morality in tort, and which courts will have to work out
step by step in demarcating the scope of any new liability."5
83. But as has been pointed out, "Neither of these assumptions [the notions of
individual self-reliance and freedom from compulsion to act] is universally true .... No
matter how rugged the owner of the burning building, [in Louisville & N. R.R. v. Scruggs
& Echols, 161 Ala. 97, 49 So. 399 (1909)] his property depended for its preservation on the
affirmative acts of the railroad employees-acts which they were evidently not disposed to
render out of kindness, and which he was in no position to induce them to perform by
bargaining. Nor would a legal duty to move the train have subjected either the employees
or the railroad company itself to anything having the slightest resemblance to slavery."
Hale, Prima Facie Torts, Combination and Non-Feasance, 46 CoL L. REV. 196, 214 (1946).
84. See Allen, Legal Duties, 40 YAiLa L. J. 331, 369 (1931).
85. Analogous problems in respect to the creation of affirmative duties arise in the
criminal law. Livingston in Code of Crimes and Punishments, in 2 CoMsLEmT WoMns
126, 127 (1873) proposed that one should be considered guilty of homicide who neglects
to save life When he could do so "without personal danger, or pecuniary loss." But ef.
MACAULAY, A PENAL CODE PPXPARED BY THE IxDiAN LAW CoMMIssION 103-6, n.M,
criticizing Livingston's proposal and adding: "What we propose is this, that where
acts are made punishable on the ground that they have caused, or have been intended
to cause, or have been known to be likely to cause a certain evil effect, omissions which
have caused, which have been intended to cause, or which have been known to be
likely to cause the same effect shall be punishable in the same manner; provided that
such omissions were, on other grounds illegal. An omission is illegal . . . if it be an
offence, if it be a breach of some direction of law, or if it be such a wrong as would
be a good ground for a civil action... .' This latter proposal was adopted. See INDIAN
PENAL CoDE Art. 593 (1930). Cf. the rule proposed by Prof. Ames: "One who fails to
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S DIAARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The early history of the common law evinces a tendency to grant
redress only for active misfeasances. Liability for omissions to act
belonged to a later period. It first worked its way into the law in sit-
uations where there was an actual assumpsit supported by a considera-
tion. As tort and contract law diverged, the doctrine of consideration
remained as an overt factor in breach of contract suits for omissions
to act, but in tort the notion of consideration became less formalized
and unnecessary as a procedural allegation. Yet even in tort the no-
tion of benefit to the obligor remained, and the situations in which
liability was imposed for nonfeasance were situations wherein a ben-
eficial relationship existed on the part of the obligor towards the ob-
ligee. The liability of owners and occupiers of land, manufacturers
and suppliers of chattels, employers, and carriers all illustrate this
principle; since such parties are in a beneficial relationship with certain
classes of persons they are held liable to such classes for nonfeasance.
Liability is rarely imposed upon persons who fail to perform gratui-
tous undertakings because by and large no beneficial relationship
there exists.
The great disparity between legal and moral obligations lies in the
area where the person under a moral duty is not in such a relationship
towards the obligee as involves benefit, as in the case of a failure of a
person to rescue a stranger. In such cases there is no antecedent ben-
eficial relation between the parties and hence no duty to act.
Liability for nonfeasance, despite its fearsome and radical connota-
tions in the minds of some courts, is nothing novel in tort law. Such
liability has existed for centuries in the areas involving benefit to the
obligor; it is but a short extension to impose this liability for breach of
clear moral obligations even if there be no relationship of antecedent
benefit. At least in the situation where one can readily aid another in
saving life, limb or property, without danger and without serious in-
convenience, it seems that the law should add to the roster of present
-affirmative duties the duty of humanitarianism. Some may object that
it will be unduly burdensome to draw the line in this new area of lia-
bility. But to argue against the enforcement of obvious moral duties
on the ground of administrative inconvenience is simply to reiterate
the ancient argument against all growth in the law and to forget that
the common law proceeds on the assumption that a "just line dravm
with difficulty exceeds in value a simple line which works dispropor-
tionate injustice." 16
interfere to save another from impending death or great bodily harm, :hen he might
do so with little or no inconvenience to himself, and the death or great bodily harm
follows as a consequence of such inaction, shall be punished criminally and shall mae
compensation to the party injured or to his widow and children in case of death:' Ames,
Law and Morals, 22 HARv. L. REV. 97, 113 (1903).
86. Harnett & Thornton, Insurable Intcrest in Property: A Soclo-Econolnic Re-
evalvation of a Legal Concept, 4S Co.. L. Rav. 1162, 113 (1943).
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